Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Semantic closure, philosophy: is an expression for the property of a language to contain expressions referring to this language, especially the predicates "is true" and "is false". Thus, sentences can be formed such as "This sentence is wrong". See also paradoxes, self-reference, expressiveness, richness, completeness, second order logic, dialethism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Donald Davidson on Semantic Closure - Dictionary of Arguments
Glüer II 23 Def Semantic Closure/Tarski: is a language (object language), if it contains a T-predicate. Def essentially rich/Tarski: is a language that does not contain variables of a higher logical type. Def semantically closed/Tarski/Glüer: Languages in which one can call one's own statements "true" (i.e. self-referential). Such languages enable the "liar paradox". A consistent definition of truth is excluded for such languages. >Paradoxes. It must not be possible to interpret the metalanguage in the object language, otherwise it would be possible to "retranslate" the definition of the W predicate formulated in the metalanguage. this leads to antinomies. The metalanguage must be Def "essentially richer"/Tarski/Glüer: to be more rich than the object language: it must contain variables of higher logical type. (sic). >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Richness, >Expressiveness._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Semantic Closure
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28